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635 
INTERNATIONAL TAX IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL TO NEUTRALIZE 
HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 
Dean Harris+ 
In 2011, Apple paid only $3.3 billion of its $34.2 billion worldwide income 
in taxes.1  This equates to a tax rate of 9.8%.2  This is roughly the same tax rate 
that an individual with an annual salary of $8,500 would pay in federal income 
tax in the United States.3 
To accomplish this favorable tax treatment, Apple used international tax 
structures such as hybrid mismatch arrangements, transfer pricing, and special 
agreements with certain jurisdictions.4  Such tax structuring is nothing new, but 
in recent years it has received increased media attention.5  This attention has led 
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2013, Gettysburg College.  The author would like to thank his parents Charles and MaryJane Harris 
for their love and support throughout law school.  The author would also like to thank the editors 
on the Catholic University Law Review for their excellent work. 
 1. Arnaud de Graaf, Paul de Haan & Maarten de Wilde, Fundamental Change in Countries’ 
Corporate Tax Framework Needed to Properly Address BEPS, 42 INTERTAX 306, 312 (2014). 
 2. Id.  Similarly, in 2013, Ford Motor Company achieved a staggering negative two and one-
half percent worldwide tax rate, making it the only S&P 100 to have a negative tax rate and 
therefore due a tax refund.  John S. Kiernan, S&P 100 Tax Rate Report, WALLETHUB (Oct. 11, 
2014), http://wallethub.com/edu/2013-corporate-tax-report/6768/.  Other corporations, however, 
such as Devon Energy, found themselves on the opposite end of the spectrum with an overall 
international tax rate of 113.5%.  See id. 
 3. See THOMAS A. BARTHOLD, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TESTIMONY OF THE 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION BEFORE THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
DEFICIT REDUCTION, 16 tbl. 2 (JCX-49-11, 2011), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func 
=startdown&id=4363; see also Kelly Phillips Erb, Making Sense of Income and Tax Terms, FORBES 
(Nov. 13, 2012, 7:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/11/13/making-
sense-of-income-and-tax-terms/#32dae716fbda (listing federal income tax rates for single 
individuals and heads of households in 2011).  Although a citizen in this tax bracket is realistically 
unlikely to owe federal income tax, this chart allows for a good comparison.  See generally Brad 
Plumer, Who Doesn’t Pay Taxes, in Eight Charts, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/09/18/who-doesnt-pay-taxes-in-charts/ 
(indicating that many poor workers do not owe federal income tax due in part to various exemptions 
in the federal tax code). 
 4. See Graaf, Hann & Wilde, supra note 1, at 312; see also The Editorial Bd., Apple’s Special 
Irish Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/ 
opinion/apples-special-irish-tax-breaks.html?_r=0 (stating that Apple had special agreements with 
countries such as Ireland, which allowed the company to avoid certain tax regulations). 
 5. See Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012),  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-
at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html?_r=0 (stating that Apple was one of the first corporations to use 
a structure called a “Double Irish With a Dutch Sandwich,” allowing the company to use Irish 
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to scrutiny from both government and non-govermenental organizations, and 
several multinational corporations now stand accused of dodging taxes.6 
In response to these accusations, and in an attempt to promote fair policies 
and close loopholes in international taxation, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) created the Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) action plan. 7   This Comment focuses on BEPS Action 2: 
“Neutralize the Effect of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements.”8 
The BEPS action plan made hybrid mismatch arrangements a main focus 
because such arrangements allow corporations to achieve double non-taxation.9  
Double non-taxation occurs when a multinational corporation does not pay 
income tax on a certain transaction or instrument in either jurisdiction in which 
the transaction occured.10 
To accomplish double non-taxation with a mismatch arrangement, a company 
finds two nations that treat the same financial instrument differently, so that a 
single instrument has different tax outcomes and, as a result, the company can 
                                                            
subsidiary companies to write off profits and achieve large tax breaks); see also Editorial Bd., Apple 
is Shifting Its Tax Burden, WASH. POST (May 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/apple-is-shifting-its-tax-burden/2013/05/21/a3a81404-c24f-11e2-9fe2-
6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html; David Kocieniewski, But Nobody Pays That; At G.E. on Tax Day, 
Billions of Reasons to Smile, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/full 
page.html?res=9E07E5DE1131F936A15750C0A9679D8B63&module=Search&mabReward=rel
bias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A17%22%7D; Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate 
Shows How $60 Billion is Lost to Tax Loopholes, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-
revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html; Margaret Heffernan, Why Starbucks’ Tax Claims Don’t Wash, 
CBS NEWS (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-starbucks-tax-claims-dont-
wash/. 
 6. See Graaf, Hann & Wilde, supra note 1, at 312; see also Doug Bolton, Apple CEO Tim 
Cook Dismisses Tax Avoidance Allegations as “Total Political Crap,” INDEP. (Dec. 21, 2015), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/apple-tim-cook-tax-avoidance-
total-political-crap-a6781601.html (discussing Apple’s disagreement with the U.S. government 
over whether it has paid its full tax burden). 
 7. See Pascal Saint-Amans & Raffaele Russo, What the BEPS are We Talking About? OECD 
(2013), http://www.oecd.org/tax/what-the-beps-are-we-talking-about.htm; see also Graaf, Hann & 
Wilde, supra note 1, at 311–12 (explaining how a base erosion or profit shifting strategy is created 
and achieves favorable tax outcomes).  The OECD is an international organization that seeks to 
“promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world,” and aims to “set international standards on a wide range of things, from agriculture and tax 
to the safety of chemicals.”  OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
 8. See generally OECD, PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT: BEPS ACTION 2: NEUTRALISE THE 
EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS (2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive 
/hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-discussion-draft-domestic-laws-recommendations-march-
2014.pdf  [hereinafter OECD, BEPS ACTION 2].  The BEPS Action Plan was endorsed by the G20 
members in September 2013 and proposes various measures designed to nullify the impact of 
hybrid mismatch arrangements.  Id. at 5–6. 
 9. See id. at 8–9. 
 10. See id.; see also Fighting Unintended Double Non-Taxation, OECD (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/fightingunintendeddoublenon-taxation.htm. 
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deduct income from the instrument from its taxes in both jurisdictions.11  This is 
called a “double deduction.” 12   A company can also create a mismatch 
arrangement when one jurisdiction allows the company to deduct a certain 
instrument—such as a loan—from its income, while a second jurisdiction does 
not classify the instrument as income, and the company consequently does not 
report funds derived from the instrument as income. 13   This is called a 
“deduction/no inclusion” or “indirect deduction/no inclusion.”14 
The OECD’s plan focuses on six types of arrangements that companies use to 
create mismatch outcomes: 1) hybrid financial instruments; 2) hybrid 
disregarded payments; 3) reverse hybrids; 4) deductible payments made by a 
hybrid; 5) deductible payments made by a dual resident; and 6) imported 
mismatches.15 
The OECD, describing the various devices that companies use to create such 
arrangements and identifying solutions to the problems that such arrangements 
cause, proposes that member states change their domestic laws to curtail 
mismatch arrangements.16  The proposal is intended to “target only instruments 
and entities that are hybrids for tax purposes and adjust only the tax outcomes 
under those arrangements.”17  This represents a new approach to hybrids, which 
                                                            
 11. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
 12. See OECD, BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: NEUTRALISING THE 
EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 14, 18 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ 
9789264218819-en [hereinafter OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS]. 
 13. Id. at 15.  The company can then shift the resulting income into a third jurisdiction through 
instruments such as loans.  Id. 
 14. Id. at 14–15; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, OECD REPORT ON ACTION 2-
HYBRID MISMATCHES 2 (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/tax-policy-
bulletin/assets/pwc-oecd-beps-hybrid-mismatches.pdf (discussing “indirect deduction/no income” 
arrangements). 
 15. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 17. 
 16. See id.; see also Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 69 (2014); David 
L. Cameron & Thomas Kittle-Kamp, Federal Income Taxation of Intellectual Properties and 
Intangible Assets, FED. INC. TAX. INTELL. PROP. & INTANGIBLE ASS. ¶ 14.11 (2014) (discussing 
the various “action items” that the OECD proposal addresses). 
 17. See generally OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8.  Four previous OECD reports, in 
1999, 2010, 2011, and 2012, addressed mismatch arrangements.  Id. at 4, 6–7.  The 1999 OECD 
report on partnerships was an early attempt at addressing hybrid mismatch arrangements using 
changes to the OECD model tax convention.  Id. at 6.  However, the report focused solely on how 
mismatches affected partnerships.  Id.  While this document shed light on mismatches, it allowed 
“fiscally transparent” non-partnership entities to continue to exploit various mismatch 
arrangements.  Id. at 4, 6–7. 
     Despite its limited focus, the 1999 report provided helpful insight for the new hybrid Action 
regarding treaty analysis and implementation.  See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF 
HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 85–86.  However, it did not address treaties 
in other contexts, and since it was published, several nations have struggled to implement and apply 
the report’s suggestions.  Id. 
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focuses on payments to and from hybrid entities that create double non-
taxation.18  The proposal also presents new ideas about including interested 
parties and introduces new rules to eliminate mismatch arrangements. 19  
Specifically, the OECD plan states that its purpose is to target instruments 
“where the resulting mismatch results in a lower aggregate tax burden for the 
parties to the arrangement.”20 This Comment argues that OECD’s proposed 
changes in domestic law will not solve the problems posed by hybrid mismatch 
arrangements and will instead target other legal structures involving hybrids that 
are not necessarily a function of the aggressive tax planning structures under 
media and governmental scrutiny.21 
                                                            
     The 2010 and 2011 reports superficially addressed hybrid mismatches, but laid the groundwork 
for an overhaul of tax structures by showing the dangers that mismatch arrangements present.  See 
generally OECD, ADDRESSING TAX RISKS INVOLVING BANK LOSSES 27-28 (2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/46023583.pdf [hereinafter OECD, ADDRESSING TAX RISKS 
INVOLVING BANK LOSSES] (discussing the revenue loss that results from corporate utilization of 
hybrid mismatch arrangements); OECD, CORPORATE LOSS UTILIZATION THROUGH AGGRESSIVE 
TAX PLANNING 57 (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264119222-en (explaining how 
companies use hybrids to exploit tax law inconsistencies in multiple jurisdictions, resulting in 
revenue loss).  In spite of national governments’ inability to capture revenue because of corporate 
utilization of hybrid mismatch arrangements, the OECD largely left it to national governments to 
tackle the problem, simply recommending that revenue bodies “bring to the attention of their 
government . . . situations . . . where the same tax loss is relieved in more than one country as a 
result of differences in tax treatment . . . to eliminate that arbitrage/mismatch opportunity.”  OECD, 
ADDRESSING TAX RISKS INVOLVING BANK LOSSES, supra at 5. 
     The 2012 report represented a significant attempt to target the use of mismatch arrangements by 
corporations.  See OECD, HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS: TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE 
ISSUES 5–6 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/HYBRIDS_ENG_ 
Final_October2012.pdf [hereinafter OECD, TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES]; OECD, 
NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 23.  The 
OECD released this report in 2012 because an increasing number of nations were growing 
concerned with mismatches.  OECD, HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS: TAX POLICY AND 
COMPLIANCE ISSUES, supra note 17, at 5.  Countries had been struggling with these arrangements 
for years leading up to the 2012 report.  Id.  For example, New Zealand paid out its largest 
settlement in history because of mismatch arrangements involving banks and Italy settled a 
multitude of cases, costing the country approximately $1.5 billion.  Id.  In the report, the OECD 
laid out a multitude of ideas on how to deal with the tax avoidance problems posed by hybrid 
mismatch arrangements, including harmonizing domestic law, implementing anti-avoidance rules, 
and promulgating rules specifically addressing mismatch arrangements.  Id. at 13–14. 
 18. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 8; OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION 
AND PROFIT SHIFTING 10, 13 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [hereinafter 
OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING]; Tom Bergin, OECD Unveils 
Proposals to Curb Corporate Tax Avoidance, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-oecd-tax-idUSKBN0HB18V20140916. 
 19. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 8; OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION 
AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 18, at 24. 
 20. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 8. 
 21. See, e.g., HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, TACKLING AGGRESSIVE TAX 
PLANNING: IMPLEMENTING THE AGREED G20-OECD APPROACH FOR ADDRESING HYBRID 
MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, 37 (Dec. 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/382382/tackling_aggressive_tax_planning_hybrids_mismatch_arran
2016] Tax Implications of the OECD Proposal 639 
This Comment begins by laying out what a hybrid mismatch arrangement is 
and the problems that such arrangements present.  Next, it discusses the Irish 
approach to hybrids, and how companies use Irish law to lower their tax 
liabilities.  This Comment then analyzes a variety of international and domestic 
approaches to hybrid mismatches, focusing specifically on the United States and 
the United Kingdom.  Next, the Comment focuses on the various approaches of 
domestic legislation, the OECD proposal, and how companies like Apple have 
leveraged each to their advantage.  Finally, it proposes that the OECD address 
changing bilateral treaties rather than the implementation of domestic 
legislation. 
I.  WHAT IS A HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENT? 
Defining a hybrid mismatch arrangement can be difficult because jurisdictions 
have not agreed on a singular definition.  It is possible to achieve a more 
comprehensive understanding by looking at several definitions.22 
Broadly, a hybrid mismatch arrangement occurs when a multinational 
corporation achieves a double deduction or deduction/no inclusion by creating a 
mismatch in its tax outcomes in two different nations.23  More narrowly, “hybrid 
mismatch arrangements incorporate techniques that exploit a difference in the 
                                                            
gements_consultation_final.pdf (stating that the OECD proposal may negatively affect intra-group 
financing arrangements that treat securities as regulatory capital but are unrelated to tax purposes); 
ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LTD., GLOBAL BANKING AND CAPITAL MARKETS: BEPS ACTION 
POINT 2 ON HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKS 4–5 (2014), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-beps-action-point2-on-hybrid-mismatch-
arrangements/$FILE/EY-tax-news-2016061703.pdf [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LTD.: 
BEPS ACTION POINT 2 ON HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS] (explaining that if the full 
proposal is implemented, some banks may need to reconsider whether many of their borrowing 
instruments could be construed as hybrid financial instruments and monitor how each holder of a 
given instrument treats the instrument for tax purposes).  While this Comment discusses a number 
of types of hybrids, at its basic level a hybrid mismatch arrangement is a type of financial instrument 
that “exploit[s] asymmetries between different tax jurisdictions.”  Hybrid Mismatches – UK 
Proposals for Implementing the BEPS Recommendations, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Dec. 17, 
2014), http://www.mwe.com/Hybrid-Mismatches-UK-Proposals-for-Implementing-the-BEPS-
Recommendations-12-16-2014/?PublicationTypes=d9093adb-e95d-4f19-819a-f0bb5170ab6d. 
 22. See Stanley C. Ruchelman, Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: 
The New OECD Discussion Drafts Regarding Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 27 J. TAX’N. & 
REG. F. INST. 25, 26 (2014), http://publications.ruchelaw.com/pdfs/2015-11/JoTRFI-Neutralizing 
HybridMismatch.pdf (providing important background information on hybrid mismatch 
arrangements in international taxation and defining hybrids as “transactions where a payment is 
made under a financial instrument[and] [t]he payor claims a deduction in its jurisdiction of 
residence, but payment is not subject to withholding tax, and the related recipient is treated in its 
jurisdiction of residence as if no taxable income is received”).  See generally OECD, BEPS ACTION 
2, supra note 8, at 8–9 (discussing different types of arrangements). 
 23. OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 8. 
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characterisation of an entity or arrangement under the laws of two or more tax 
jurisdictions to produce a mismatch in tax outcomes.”24 
There are three main types of desirable tax outcomes stemming from 
mismatch arrangements: double deductions; deduction/no inclusions; and 
indirect deduction/no inclusions.25  Double deductions are “payments that give 
rise to duplicate deductions from the same expenditure.” 26   Deduction/no 
inclusions are “payments that are deductible under the rules of the jurisdiction 
of the payer and not included in the income of the recipient.” 27   Indirect 
deduction/no inclusions arise through the use of imported mismatches.28  Using 
a basic instrument such as a regular loan, the arrangement exploits a lack of 
mismatch regulation in an investor jurisdiction to create a deduction/no inclusion 
arrangement.29 
Companies use three main types of instruments to create these desirable tax 
outcomes: hybrid financial instruments and transfers, hybrid entity payments, 
and reverse hybrids and imported mismatches.30  Each instrument works in a 
different way to benefit a taxpayer and can be used alone or in conjunction with 
another instrument.31 
A.  Hybrid Financial Instruments and Transfers 
This type of hybrid mismatch arrangement involves a financing arrangement 
that is subject to two different classifications in two or more jurisdictions,32 
                                                            
 24. Id.  The OECD states that the extent of a hybrid mismatch is found “by comparing the tax 
treatment of the payment under the laws of each jurisdiction where the mismatch arises.”  OECD, 
NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 29. 
 25. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 8–9; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
OECD REPORT ON ACTION 2-HYBRID MISMATCHES, supra note 14, at 2. 
 26. OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 8.  In federal income tax, this would be the 
equivalent of being able to include the same item on your taxes as two different deductions.  See 
26 U.S.C. §§ 162(a) et seq., 212 et seq. (2012) (providing for deductions for business expenses and 
production of income expenses). 
 27. OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 8. 
 28. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 59. 
 29. Id. at 59. 
 30. See generally id. at 17, 25, 55, 84–89, 158 (describing and providing recommendations 
on the different types of financial instruments that companies avail themselves of). 
 31. See id.; see also ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LTD.: BEPS ACTION POINT 2 ON HYBRID 
MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS , supra note 21, at 2; Ruchelman, supra note 22, at 26–27. 
 32. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 33–34; see also DELOITTE, UNITED STATES TAX ALERT: OECD RELEASES BEPS 
DRAFT ON HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/ 
Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-alert-unitedstates-040414.pdf [hereinafter DELOITTE, 
OECD RELEASES BEPS DRAFT ON HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS] (providing an example 
of financial instruments in which “the payment . . . is deductible as debt in one taxing jurisdiction 
and taxed as a dividend disitribution in another taxing jurisdiction”). 
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resulting in a deduction/no inclusion. 33   The most common forms of this 
instrument are loans. 34   For example, one jurisdiction treats the loan as 
deductible debt while the other jurisdiction treats it as equity and taxes it as a 
dividend distribution.35  One jurisdiction, therefore, does not treat the instrument 
as taxable income.36 
The most effective and widely used instrument that the OECD examines in its 
report is the collateralized “repo” loan.37  This type of agreement involves a sale 
and repurchase of an asset from the same company. 38   The repurchasing 
company creates a mismatch because one jurisdiction views the deal as a sale, 
essentially disregarding the buyback of the asset, and the other jurisdiction views 
it as a loan, subjecting it to the same treatment it would normally give a loan.39 
A typical repo loan involves three parties: two parent companies and at least 
one subsidiary company.40  The OECD states that a collateralized repo loan 
works in the following manner: 
A sells the shares of B Sub to B Co under an arrangement that A Co 
(or an affiliate) will acquire those shares at a future date for an agreed 
price.  Between sale and repurchase, B Sub makes distributions on the 
shares to B Co. . . .  The net cost of the repo to A Co is treated as a 
deductible financing cost.  A Co’s cost includes the B Sub dividends 
that are paid to and retained by B Co.  Country B will typically grant 
a credit, exclusion, exemption or some other tax relief to B Co on the 
dividends received.  B Co also treats the transfer of the shares back to 
A Co as a genuine sale of shares and may exempt any gain on disposal 
under an equity participation exemption or a general exclusion for 
capital gains.  The combined effect of the repo transaction is, 
therefore, to generate a deduction for A Co in respect of the aggregate 
payments made under the repo with no corresponding inclusion for B 
Co.41 
                                                            
 33. See DELOITTE, OECD RELEASES BEPS DRAFT ON HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, 
supra note 32. 
 34. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 20–23 (listing several types of instruments 
that create such an arrangement, including but not limited to: collateralized repo loans, share 
lending repo loans, double dips on withholding tax credits, and certain loans from tax exempt 
organizations). 
 35. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 33–34. 
 36. See id.; see also DELOITTE GLOBAL, BEPS ACTION 2: HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ie/Documents/Tax/ 
beps_action_2.pdf. 
 37. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 34. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 34–35. 
 40. Id. at 35. 
 41. Id. 
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These instruments are popular for international tax planning because they 
allow companies to implement a deduction/no inclusion scheme while obtaining 
tax credits.42 
B.  Hybrid Entity Payments 
Hybrid entity payments exploit a difference in views on how a given 
taxpaying entity should be classified.43  These arrangements can result in either 
a double deduction, or a deduction/no inclusion.44  The most basic use of this 
instrument involves the use of hybrid subsidiaries that are transparent for tax 
purposes in one jurisdiction, but not in another.45 
The OECD illustrates a basic double deduction structure using a common 
hybrid entity technique: Company A holds all shares of its foreign-based 
subsidiary Company B, a hybrid entity, which is not taxed by the country in 
which Company A resides.46  Company B proceeds to take out a loan and pays 
interest, but has no other income of any kind.47  Because Company B is not taxed 
in the country in which Company A, its parent company, is based, Company A 
is seen as the borrower.48  Company B then works through a subsidiary to 
“surrender the tax benefit of the interest deduction,” enabling Company A to 
treat the interest as separate income in countries A and B, resulting in a double 
deduction.49 
C.  Reverse Hybrids and Imported Mismatches 
A basic imported mismatch using a hybrid financial instrument involves the 
creation of a hybrid structure under two jurisdictions, which is then “imported” 
into a third jurisdiction.50  Imported mismatches can be quite complex, often 
involving several companies and jurisdictions.51  Reverse hybrids, structures 
                                                            
 42. See Ruchelman, supra note 22, at 26 (explaining that the “effect of the repo transaction is 
. . . to generate a deduction for [one company] in respect of the aggregate payments made under the 
repo with no corresponding inclusion for [the other company]”). 
 43. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 29. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Ruchelman, supra note 22, at 28. 
 46. OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 44–45; Ruchelman, supra note 22, at 28. 
 47. Ruchelman, supra note 22, at 28. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 57; OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF 
HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 59. 
 51. See generally id. at 58–60.  A good example comes from OECD’s draft which states an 
imported mismatch would occur when: 
B Co is a wholly-owned subsidiary of A Co.  A Co lends money to B Co using a hybrid 
financial instrument.  The payments under this instrument will be exempt from tax under 
the laws of Country A, while being deductible under the laws of Country B.  Borrower 
Co borrows money from B Co.  Interest payable under the loan is deductible under the 
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result in an indirect deduction/no inclusion,52 are a more specific subset of this 
instrument.53 
For imported mismatch structure to apply, either the parties involved in the 
arrangement must be in the same control group, or there must be a structured 
arrangement to which all of the groups are a party.54  The OECD admits that 
rules regarding imported mismatches are not flawless, and more research is 
needed to ensure that double taxation does not remain an issue under new 
regulations.55 
1.  Why Are Mismatch Arrangements Such a Problem? 
As discussed previously in this Comment, double non-taxation is a major 
problem in international tax structuring because countries should be entitled to 
tax income earned within their respective jurisdictions, something that these 
arrangements prevent.56 
Hybrid mismatch arrangements present a unique problem within double non-
taxation structures because of how difficult it is to track such arrangements.57  It 
is hard to pinpoint when, where, and if a company is using a mismatch 
arrangement.58  Further exacerbating this problem, government entities are hard-
                                                            
laws of Borrower Co’s jurisdiction (Country C) and included in income by B Co under 
Country B law.  The result of this structure is an indirect D/NI outcome between 
Countries A and C. Country B’s tax revenue is unaffected as the income and deductions 
of B Co offset each other. 
Id. at 58. 
 52. OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 59. 
 53. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 57. 
 54. OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 59–60.  Under the OECD proposal, parties are part of the same control group if one of 
four factors are met: 1) two persons are “consolidated for accounting purposes;” 2) one person has 
an investment that gives them control over the second or third person in a transaction; 3) the “first 
person has a 50% or greater investment in the second person, or there is a third person that holds a 
50% or greater investment in both;” and 4) the two groups can be defined as “associated 
enterprises” under Article 9 of the OECD model tax convention, or a tax treaty that has adopted the 
rules of article 9.  Id. at 69. 
 55. Id. at 11 (stating that “there are a number of specific areas where the recommended 
domestic rules . . . may need to be further refined”).  In the global business context, “double taxation 
occurs when more than one country has and exercises jurisdiction to impose an income tax on the 
same income.” Yoseph Edrey Adrienne Jeffrey, Taxation of International Activity: Over Relief 
from Double Taxation Under the U.S. Tax System, 9 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 101, 102 (1991). 
 56. See generally Joseph B. Darby III & Kelsey Lemaster, Double Irish More than Doubles 
the Tax Saving: Hybrid Structure Reduces Irish, U.S. and Worldwide Taxation, PRAC. US/INT’L 
TAX STRATEGIES, May 15, 2007, at 2 (discussing U.S. efforts to prevent corporations from 
avoiding or deferring taxes in order to capture revenue). 
 57. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 4. 
 58. See generally OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 30–31 (discussing the difficulties of detecting the operation of 
a hybrid financial instrument). 
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pressed for time and resources,59 while researching whether an arrangement is 
being used to create a mismatch or is simply a regular instrument is resource-
intensive endeavor.60  Additionally, it is often difficult to discern which country 
is losing tax revenue under a given arrangement.61 
II.  THE IRISH APPROACH 
Multinational corporations frequently use Ireland as a destination for 
aggressive tax planning.62  Ireland’s rules regarding mismatch arrangements 
give considerable leeway in comparison to those of other nations, such as the 
United States.63  Ireland plays a large role in hybrid mismatch arrangements, and 
its unique legislation regarding interest and loans is especially pertinent.64 
A.  Interest as a Trading Expense 
Ireland allows a deduction for any interest solely for the purpose of trades.65  
For interest to be considered a trading expense, it must not have a capital nature, 
but even if it does, it can still be deducted if the interest would be otherwise 
deductible.66 
These deductions have been considered by the Irish courts, as seen in 
MacAonghusa v. Ringmahon Co.67  In this case, Ringmahon acquired a number 
of supermarkets through an intercompany loan, which was replaced by 
preference shares. 68   Ringmahon then obtained a bank loan solely for the 
purpose of redeeming those preference shares.69  The Supreme Court of Ireland 
allowed the company to write off the interest as a deduction because it was solely 
a trade-based interaction.70  The company successfully argued that because no 
new instrument or asset had been acquired, it could get rid of share capital and 
                                                            
 59. See id.; see also Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 736 
(2011). 
 60. See Kleinbard, supra note 59, at 736. 
 61. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 4. 
 62. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 56, at 12. 
 63. See id.; see also Danielle Kurtzleben, The Global Race to the Bottom in Corporate Taxes, 
U.S. NEWS (July 13, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/07/23/charts-the-global-
race-to-the-bottom-in-corporate-taxes. 
 64. See, e.g., Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 §§ 82(2), 243, 246(3), 247, 249 (Ir.); see also 
infra Part II. 
 65. See Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 § 82(2) (Ir.) (noting that interest reduction schemes 
such as this can be used to facilitate collateralized repo loans, a major part of BEPS: Action 2); see 
also OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 20. 
 66. See Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 §§ 80(1), 81(2)(f), (h), 82(1)–(3) (Ir.). 
 67. [2001] 2 IR 507 (Ir.), http://www.supremecourt.ie/Judgments.nsf/60f9f366f10958d180 
2572ba003d3f45/ceeb2b2eadc6a75180256ccc004f2398?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,MacAong
husa%20. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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continue its business by using bank loans on which to pay interest, thereby 
allowing the deduction.71 
B.  Interest as a Charge 
Where a company has interest from obtaining shares in, or loaning money to, 
other companies, it can be deducted as “interest as a charge.”72  Whether a 
foreign company pays income taxes on a transaction with an Irish company has 
no impact on the deductibility of interest from the Irish company.73 
Companies can also combine the strategies of interest solely for the purpose 
of a trade and interest as a charge to further take advantage of double deductions 
on interest.74  For instance, it is possible for an investing company to give money 
to a trading institution and, under current statutory provisions, it is unclear 
whether the loan has to be used for its lifetime in the trade of the company or it 
could be used for trade purposes on the first day of its installment, and that would 
be sufficient to constitute it as interest as a charge; thereby, later changing its 
purpose but nevertheless acquiring interest deductions.75    
Ireland’s corporate tax law played a large part in Apple’s ability to achieve its 
low overall income tax rate.76  Apple paid a mere two percent income tax in 
Ireland in 2013, leading the European Union (EU) to assert that Ireland violated 
portions of the EU treaty by allowing Apple to use aggressive tax planning 
strategies, such as hybrid mismatch arrangements.77 
                                                            
 71. Id. 
 72. Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 § 243(9) (Ir.); see also id. §§ 247, 249 (Ir.).  Section 247 
lays out requirements for interest as a charge, which must meet all of the requirements previously 
set out in Section 243.  See id. at § 247.  Furthermore, Section 249 is only applicable in recovery 
of capital situations in regards to a Section 247 loan.  See id. at § 249.  So, in theory, a mismatch is 
possible using these sections.  For further explanation regarding interest as a charge, see generally 
Lorraine Griffith, Deloitte Ireland, Section 247-The Devil’s in the Detail, in IRISH TAX INST., ANN. 
CONF. 203-21 (2013). 
 73. See Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 § 246(3) (Ir.). 
 74. See Griffith, supra note 72, at 212–13, 217. 
 75. See id. at 212.  Simply called the “Day [One]” test; this question remains up for debate.  
Id.  Companies have been able to use such a situation to achieve a deduction; however, the future 
of these installments is unclear.  Id. 
 76. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 77. See Apple’s Special Irish Tax Breaks, supra note 4.  The Irish government had its reasons 
for giving Apple the tax treatment that it did, as Apple is one of the largest employers in certain 
parts of Ireland, especially County Cork, where it employs 4,000 people.  Id.  Tax professionals 
have likened Ireland’s treatment to many American cities and states willing to give tax breaks in 
turn for job creation.  Id.; see also Julia Fioretti & Tom Bergin, EU Says Ireland Swapped Apple 
Tax Deal for Jobs, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/09/30/us-apple-ireland-tax-idUSKCN0HP0QT20140930. 
646 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:635 
III.  SOLUTIONS TO HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 
A.  United States Legislation 
The United States addresses several types of mismatch arrangements both in 
domestic legislation and in treaties with other nations.  The United States targets 
double deductions and losses through Section 1503(d) of the Internal Revenue 
Code.78 
Dual resident corporations cannot take a single loss to offset income subject 
to a U.S. tax and then do so again for income subject to a foreign tax.79  A 
corporation may not use a dual consolidated loss—defined in part as “any net 
operating loss of a domestic corporation which is subject to an income tax of a 
foreign country on its income without regard to whether such income is from 
sources in or outside of such foreign country,”—which would be used to offset 
income from a “domestic affiliate.”80 
The United States also instituted rules for minimizing the effect of foreign tax 
credit abuse.81  Under Section 909 of the Internal Revenue Code, a foreign tax 
credit splitting event has occurred if an entity pays a foreign tax, but that income 
is used to pay taxes taken into account by another entity known as a covered 
person.82  If such an event occurs, the paid foreign tax will not be taken into 
                                                            
 78. 26 U.S.C. § 1503(d) (2012).  A dual consolidated loss is defined as “any net operating 
loss of a domestic corporation which is subject to an income tax of a foreign country on its income 
without regard to whether such income is from sources in or outside of such foreign country, or is 
subject to such a tax on a residence basis.”  Id. 
 79. See id. at § 1503(d)(2)(A).  The OECD states a dual consolidated company would create 
a double deduction in this manner: 
A Co (a company incorporated and tax resident in Country A) holds all the shares in B 
Co  (a company incorporated in Country B but tax resident in both Country A and 
Country B). B Co owns all the shares in B Sub 1 (a company tax resident and incorporated 
in Country B). B Co is consolidated, for tax purposes, with both A Co (under Country A 
law) and B Sub 1 (under B Country Law). 
OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 
55. 
 80. 26 U.S.C. § 1503(d)(2); see also OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID 
MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 55–57. 
 81. 26 U.S.C. § 909 (2012).  This issue arose with regard to multinational corporations 
acquiring excess foreign tax credits.  See BLOOMBERG TAX AND ACCOUNTING CTR., U.S. TAX 
OVERVIEW, STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, CH. XIV. U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, (F) THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT (2014), https://taxandaccounting.bna. 
com/btac/T1900/split_display.adp?fedfid=17877948&vname=tmetpor&fcn=58&wsn=501982086
&fn=17877948&split=0.  After all domestic taxes were paid and credited, then the taxpayer would 
be able to credit even more foreign tax, and could structure its arrangements to receive large 
amounts of credits on rather small amounts of income.  Id.  Taxpayers have utilized hybrid 
arrangements placing foreign taxes under the purview of a high-tier entity, while income is 
consolidated in a low-tier entity.  Id.  The foreign tax entity would then send earnings back to the 
U.S., taking advantage of the foreign taxes as a credit.  Id. 
 82. 26 U.S.C. § 909(d)(1), (d)(4) (2012) (regarding the tax paying entity, under § 909(d)(4), 
a covered person is: (1) an entity owned ten percent or more by the payer; (2) an entity that owns 
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account for U.S. tax purposes until the tax paying entity takes into account the 
income on which those taxes were paid.83 
The IRS identified four arrangements that Section 909 would affect for pre-
2011 years, and that could possibly be added for years post-2010.84  These 
instruments included: (1) reverse hybrids in which one entity pays tax for the 
other entity; 85  (2) foreign consolidated groups which do not allocate 
consolidated foreign taxes to accord for each member’s share; (3) group or other 
loss-sharing arrangements;86 and (4) hybrid instruments.87 
In addition to domestic legislation, the United States addresses mismatch 
issues in bilateral treaties. 88   The 1989 United States treaty with Germany 
provided that each jurisdiction would have freedom to deal with “‘hybrid’ 
financial instruments that have both debt and equity features,” and stated that 
each country could apply its statutory withholding rate as long as they permit 
payments under the instrument to be deducted.89 
The United States also has rules for specific entities built into its bilateral 
treaties.90  For instance, certain Canadian instruments treated as partnerships 
(such as United States limited liability corporations under the federal code) are 
subject to a branch tax and are not entitled to certain treaty benefits if they are 
operating in Canada as a hybrid entity.91 
                                                            
ten percent or more of the tax paying entity; (3) a related person under §§ 267(b) or 707(b); (4) any 
other person the secretary designates). 
 83. See id. at § 909. 
 84. See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2010-92 916-23 (2010), https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-irbs/irb10-52.pdf [hereinafter IRS BULLETIN] (discussing the applicability of Section 909 
of the Internal Revenue Code to certain foreign taxes). 
 85. See 26 U.S.C. § 909; see also William P. Streng, U.S. Tax Treaties: Trends, Issues, and 
Policies in 2006 and Beyond, 59 SMU L. REV. 853, 874 (2006) (giving a more complete description 
of how a reverse hybrid structure could be used to achieve double non-taxation). 
 86. See IRS BULLETIN, supra note 84, at 919 (noting that these structures must contain three 
further elements: (1) a foreign debt instrument disregarded for U.S. purposes; (2) the instrument 
owner pays foreign tax attributable to said instrument; (3) the issuer receives a deduction for the 
foreign tax and suffers a shared loss, which is then taken into account by one or more “covered 
persons with respect to the owner of the instrument”). 
 87. See IRS BULLETIN, supra note 84, at 919; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
A hybrid instrument as defined could refer to a collateralized repo loan, mentioned earlier in this 
Comment.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text.   The United States wanted to stop these 
devices due to artificial credit generation allowing for excess repayment.  See supra note 81 and 
accompanying text.  Many nations continue to see such transactions as a sale, not a loan, which 
allows this credit generation to continue abroad.  See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 88. See, e.g., BLOOMBERG BNA, WORKSHEET 11 1989 GERMANY-UNITED STATES INCOME 
AND CAPITAL TAX TREATY 1 (1989) (discussing a bilateral treaty between Germany and the United 
States that focuses on mismatch issues). 
 89. Id. at 3. 
 90. See infra note 109 and accompanying text (identifying an example of specific rules for 
United States limited liability companies). 
 91. See TD Sec. LLC v. The Queen, [2010] C.T.C 186 (Can.); see also Income Tax 
Convention art. XIV, U.S. – Can., Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,087; Thomas Kollruss et al., 
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B.  United Kingdom Legislation 
The United Kingdom enacted specific rules to address hybrid mismatch 
arrangements as early as 2003.92  These rules target different types of deduction 
schemes.93  The rule only applies if four separate “avoidance scheme” conditions 
are met: 1) the transactions of the company are part of a “scheme that is a 
deduction scheme;” 2) the company has claimed or can claim a deduction or can 
offset an amount of the transaction against profits; 3) “the main purpose of the 
scheme, or one of its main purposes, is to achieve a U.K. tax advantage;” and 4) 
the tax advantage achieved is “more than minimal.”94   Pursuant to Section 
233(1) of The Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act, the legislation 
specifies in Sections 336–42 seven types of deduction schemes. 95   This 
legislation is activated when a Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) 
officer sends a notice to an infringing company; and unless a U.K. company can 
show a clear need for it, HMRC will generally scrutinize the scheme for tax 
avoidance.96   Most legislation from other jurisdictions shares this theme of 
involving several “qualifying steps” or “schemes.”97 
The Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act targets credit 
generation through a qualifying step approach.  It states that a qualifying scheme 
must fall within at least one of five circumstances: 1) the foreign credit is 
supposed to be attributed to a different source from which income is derived; 2) 
the foreign taxpayer has not accounted for the full economic cost of said tax 
against the income for which they claim relief; 3) an election or option existed 
in another jurisdiction that would have reduced the credits given, instead of 
increasing the amount; 4) the credits given reduce the amount of tax payable to 
an amount lower than what would have been paid had the scheme not existed; 
                                                            
Canadian MNCs International Tax Planning: Treaty and Practice, 42 INTERTAX 276,  284-86 
(2014) (providing an example of how firms might use this taxing principle); see also OECD, TAX 
POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES, supra note 17, at 17 n.14, 18 n.16. 
 92. James Ross, Bloomberg Tax and Accounting Center, Host Country United Kingdom, 35 
TAX MGMT. INT’L FORUM, Dec. 2014, at 118, 119-20; see also infra note 93. 
 93. See Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010, c. 8, §§ 233–42 (U.K.). 
 94. Id. at § 233. 
 95. See id. at §§ 233(1), 236–42.  The seven applicable schemes are: Schemes involving 
hybrid entities (§ 236); Instruments of alterable character (§ 237); Shares subject to conversion 
(§238), Securities subject to conversion (§ 239); Debt instruments treated as equity (§ 240); 
Schemes including issue of shares not conferring qualifying beneficial entitlement (§ 241); 
Schemes including transfer of rights under a security (§ 242).  Id. 
 96. Id. at § 232; see also HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE & CUSTOMS, INTERNATIONAL MANUAL 
59730, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM597530.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 97. See generally OECD, TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES, supra note 17 at 15–22 
(comparing and contrasting anti-hybrid rules in several different jurisdictions, including: Denmark, 
Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, and the United States); Jakob 
Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law–Part 1, 53 EUR. TAX’N 539, 548 
n.80 (2013).  Recent German legislation has made it so that a company may not obtain a tax 
exemption “to the extent that the dividend is deductible in the state of the payor.”  Id. 
at 548. 
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and 5) a source of income, usually subject to a foreign tax, has been acquired as 
consideration for a tax deduction.98  If these conditions are satisfied, HMRC will 
then deliver a notice that the legislation applies and the scheme is being rejected, 
or may give an opinion on how much credit will be allowed under the given 
scheme.99 
IV.  ANALYZING THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A.  The United States’ Approach 
Some observers have posited that the United States has implemented 
overreaching legislation to deal with hybrid mismatch arrangements. 100  
However, tax revenue loss is a very real problem for the United States.  For 
example, in 2011 alone, the United States lost an estimated $3.5 billion in eleven 
mismatch transactions. 101   In addition, many of the lowest tax paying 
multinational corporations are incorporated and headquartered in the United 
States.102 
Apple has one of the lowest income tax rates among the international 
corporate community. 103   The company’s lucrative tax structure relies on 
exploiting vulnerabilities in the U.S. tax code.104  Apple has been able to create 
mismatch arrangements that are then exported to other jurisdictions. 105  
Typically Apple then importes the maximum amount of foreign tax credit 
allowable back into the United States, while taking the deduction for the 
mismatch in the other jurisdictions.106  This structure allowed Apple to avoid 
deduction restrictions under Section 1503 by using credits instead of deductions, 
but lowering its international liability at the same time.107 
                                                            
 98. OECD, TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES, supra note 17, at 20-21. 
 99. Id. at 21. 
 100. See Andriy Krahmal, International Hybrid Instruments: Jurisdiction Dependent 
Characterization, 5 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 98, 100 (2005) (“Some commentators point out that 
check-the-box regulations, promulgated to improve the administrability of entity classification, 
reach too far by including foreign entities in their regulatory reach, thus creating additional 
opportunities for tax arbitrage.”). 
 101. OECD, TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES, supra note 17, at 5–6. 
 102. See Kiernan, supra note 2. 
 103. Kocieniewski, supra note 5. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id.; Graaf, Hann & Wilde, supra note 1, at 312; OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS 
OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 36; David Jolly, O.E.C.D. Calls for 
Coordinated Fight Against Corporate Tax Avoidance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/business/international/oecd-fights-corporate-tax-
avoidance.html?_r=0 (“[T]he rules governing global tax affairs, created in the 1920s, can seem out 
of touch when a Google, Apple or Microsoft can move millions or billions of dollars of profit from 
one country to another at the click of a button.”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  It is important to note that mismatch 
arrangement structures such as those implemented by Apple, though helpful for tax structuring, are 
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Apple is not the only American corporation using these structures.108  In fact, 
a corporation or partnership need not be creative at all to create a mismatch 
arrangement under current standards and the “check-the-box” rules.109  These 
regulations allow taxpayers to check off whether they want to be treated as a 
corporation or a transparent entity for tax purposes, which greatly increased the 
use of hybrid instruments in the United States. 110   For example, Canadian 
partnerships “checking the box” to be a corporation for U.S. tax purposes could 
use U.S. tower structures to fund acquisitions and receive a double deduction.111 
B.  The United Kingdom Approach 
The U.K.’s qualifying step approach is common because (though seemingly 
complex at first glance) it actually makes it easier for the taxpayer to decipher 
what structures will fit into the legislation.112 
In the case of hybrid mismatch arrangements, however, such an approach can 
create a double-edged sword.  Having many qualifying steps could allow a 
company to more specifically tailor its instruments to fit inside the bounds of the 
code.113  Also, a corporation can simply look for the most beneficial qualifiers 
for its desired arrangement in a different jurisdiction, thereby avoiding more 
stringent standards altogether. 
                                                            
not the only instruments that reduce tax liability. See, e.g., Katie Walsh, Transfer Pricing Rules 
Core Issue In Apple Profit Shifting, FIN. REV. (May 22, 2013) http://www.afr.com/p/technology/ 
transfer_pricing_rules_core_issue_OvzcB7ybbCrkvwOTBkjEIN (discussing Apple’s use of 
transfer pricing rules to obtain a tax advantage). 
 108. Krahmal, supra note 100, at 101 (commenting on the widespread use of hybrid 
instruments).  See also Kiernan, supra note 2. 
 109. See Krahmal, supra note 100, at 100; KPMG, OECD TAKES AIM AT INTERNATIONAL 
HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 3 (2014), https://www.kpmg.com/Ca/en/IssuesAndInsights/ 
ArticlesPublications/TNF/Pages/tnfc1423.pdf. 
 110. Krahmal, supra note 100, at 100. 
 111. KPMG, OECD TAKES AIM AT INTERNATIONAL HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, 
supra note 109, at 3.  A “tower structure” works in the following manner: 
The lower level UK company pays interest on the loan to the top UK company. For UK 
purposes, the interest income is offset by the interest expense under normal group relief 
rules – so there is no net taxable income. For US purposes, the UK subsidiary is a 
disregarded entity, so its interest expense is taken as a deduction in the US parent and, 
through the US consolidated tax return, offset against trading profits in the US subsidiary. 
The UK company sandwiched in the US group is a hybrid entity, in that it is regarded as 
a company in the UK and as a branch in the US. The result is that two deductions are 
claimed for a single payment of interest. 
Bill Dodwell, Tumbling Tower, TAXADVISOR (Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.taxadvisermagazine. 
com/article/tumbling-tower. 
 112. See Graaf, Hann & Wilde, supra note 1, at 312. 
 113. See generally supra Section III.B; Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 
2010, c. 8, § 233 (U.K.). 
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Apple took full advantage of the U.K. tax structure, paying no U.K. income 
tax in 2012 and only one percent in 2013.114  Apple was able to do this because 
it paid a very high percentage of its expenditure to itself through its subsidiaries 
in other countries.115  A great deal of its U.K. profit was placed into special loans, 
which were given to subsidiary companies in Ireland through hybrid entity 
payments, allowing Apple to write off massive amounts of profit.116 
C.  The OECD Proposal, Trying to Change the Approach 
The 2014 OECD proposal attempts to fix the problems caused by these 
mismatch arrangements through a series of recommended rules that vary 
between each hybrid mismatch structure.117  The rules set out by the OECD are 
broad, imprecise, and attempt to solve the problem through vague 
recommendations.118 
The proposal first discusses the rules for deduction/no inclusion schemes.119  
The OECD states these instruments should be neutralized “through the adoption 
of a linking rule that aligns the tax outcomes for the payer and payee under a 
financial instrument.”120  The payer should simply deny any deduction under 
such an arrangement, and if this does not work, then the payee jurisdiction 
should include it as ordinary income.121  “Reasonable” timing differences in 
payment recognition under these arrangements will not be treated as giving rise 
                                                            
 114. Apple Paid No UK Corporate Taxes in 2012: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/01/apple-uk-corporate-tax_n_3528372.html; Frankie 
Goodway, Apple’s UK Tax Avoidance In Two Numbers, MIRROR (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/ampp3d/apples-uk-tax-avoidance-two-4344344 (explaining that by 
paying £11.4 million in corporate taxes on £100 million in revenue, Apple’s “effective” U.K. tax 
rate was one percent). 
 115. See Goodway, supra note 114. 
 116. See id.  This exemplifies the complexity and usefulness of these arrangements.  It is 
important to note that Apple’s UK tax structuring was not based entirely off of mismatch 
arrangements—transfer pricing has always played a large role in its profit shifting.  See Walsh, 
supra note 107.  In addition, due to special VAT taxes in Europe, Apple pays no taxes at all on 
money raised from iTunes in the UK; those funds go directly to Luxembourg.  See Tim Worstall, 
Apple Dodges All Taxes In The UK—Again, FORBES (July 1, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
timworstall/2013/07/01/apple-dodges-all-taxes-in-the-uk-again/. 
 117. See, e.g., OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, 
supra note 12, at 59–61 (recommending rules for arrangements that produce indirect deductions/no 
income). 
 118. For instance, one U.S. Treasury Department official stated that while the U.S. “is pleased 
with the final reports,” another stated that the U.S. is “concerned that the work did not go further” 
and “concerned that the standards adopted are too vague and will lead to increased tax disputes.”  
Now it’s Up to the Nations: OECD Delivers Global Tax Plan, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://www.bna.com/nations-oecd-delivers-n57982059152/; see also infra Sections IV.C.2–5. 
 119. OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 59–61. 
 120. Id. at 36. 
 121. Id. at 37. 
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to a deduction/no inclusion scheme.122  The recommendation goes on to state 
that this rule only applies to instruments entered into with a “related party” and 
will not apply at all where the instrument is used “to preserve tax neutrality for 
the payer and payee.”123 
The OECD proposes the same plan for double deduction schemes, 
neutralizing mismatch arrangements through linking rules that align tax 
outcomes. 124   However, the double deduction rule only applies where the 
mismatch parties are in the same “control group . . . or structured 
arrangement.”125 
The report finally recommends a rule for indirect deduction/no inclusion 
structures. 126   The report proposes vaguely that every jurisdiction should 
implement a linking rule denying deductions for a payment made under an 
imported mismatch.127  The rule will only apply to payments that are offset 
against a deduction in the imported mismatch, and only if the parties are once 
again, in the same “control group” or “structured arrangement.”128 
1.  Proposals to Neutralize Hybrid Mismatches 
In its public discussion draft of the BEPS action plan, the OECD proposed 
two separate approaches for implementing these recommended rules: the 
“bottom-up” and “top-down” approach.129  A “bottom-up” approach seeks to 
identify structures that involve the most pressing issues for tax policy.130  This 
includes “related parties” and instruments as part of a structured mismatch 
design.131  The OECD believes this will result in a more focused approach for 
the implementation of the proposal.132  This approach will take a significant 
                                                            
 122. Id. at 36. 
 123. Id. at 36, 38. 
 124. Id. at 52. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 60. 
 127. Id. at 60–61. 
 128. Id. at 52. 
 129. See OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 33. 
 130. Id.; see also OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 67.  The deliverable BEPS action plan narrowed the focus to 
only a bottom-up approach, which includes financial instruments held by related parties or held by 
parties within the same structured arrangement.  A structured arrangement “is any arrangement 
where the hybrid mismatch is priced into the terms of the arrangement or the facts and 
circumstances (including the terms) of the arrangement indicate that it has been designed to produce 
a hybrid mismatch.” OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 67.  Two persons are defined as related persons “if they are in 
the same control group or the first person has a 25% or greater investment in the second person.”  
Id. at 69. 
 131. OECD, BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 8, at 33. 
 132. Id. 
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period of time.  It would require going through every transaction to identify 
whether it is a mismatch arrangement or not for the corporation involved.133 
The “top-down” approach will work much differently. 134   This approach 
would start with a rule encompassing all hybrid instruments, unless excepted 
under narrow criteria, making compliance difficult for taxpayers. 135   This 
approach would catch many more arrangements in its scope, but would allow 
for “different carve outs for different taxpayers in respect of those different 
instruments.”136  The OECD states this approach will be more “comprehensive” 
because only arrangements that clearly need to be excluded will be.137  This 
approach will have one broad overarching rule that will catch all arrangements 
unless they can fall into an exception.138  
2.  Definition Issues 
International acceptance of definitions is a constant issue, and small 
deviations can cause large problems when it comes to tax treaties and 
conventions. 139   Definitional issues exist even within the proposed OECD 
model.140 
The proposal presents broad definitions of other topics, which decreases the 
likelihood of implementation because of overly extensive coverage.141  Perhaps 
the biggest issue is with the definition of “related parties,” regardless of the 
jurisdiction’s implemented approach.142  Several groups have pointed out that a 
holder of a financial instrument who is considered a “related” party with as little 
                                                            
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (these limited exceptions are not defined further in the proposal). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Sven-Eric Bärsch, The Definitions of Dividends and Interest Contained in the 
OECD Model, Actual Tax Treaties, and the German Model, 42 INTERTAX 433, 440 (2014).  This 
article provides examples of the OECD model tax treaty definitions of terms such as dividend and 
interest.  Id. at 434–37.  In the case of Germany, for example, most tax treaties and domestic laws 
deviate from the OECD’s exact model and wording, allowing instruments such as hybrid 
arrangements to thrive because small changes lead to different treatment.  Id. at 440.  Only the 
German model has come close to solving this issue, but it is still not capable of providing “legal 
certainty” and does not tackle the issue of mismatch arrangements fully.  Id. at 443. 
 140. See id. at 434–37, 443. 
 141. See Letter from Will Morris, Chair, BIAC Tax Committee, to Achim Pross, Head, 
International Co-operation and Tax Administration Division, Centre for Tax Policy Administration, 
OECD (May 2, 2014), in OECD, COMMENTS RECEIVED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFTS: BEPS 
ACTION 2: NEUTRALISE THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 80–81 (2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/comments-action-2-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements.pdf 
(stating the definitions of “hybrid instrument” and “ordinary income” are so broad that they go 
beyond what the 2014 OECD proposal is intended to accomplish). 
 142. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 67, 69. 
654 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:635 
as ten percent ownership of its equity may potentially be subject to action under 
the proposed rules.143  This raises a concern that such an ownership threshold is 
too low and encompasses commercial transactions that present no risk of a 
hybrid mismatch.144  This is especially pertinent for banks, which would have to 
spend large portions of time monitoring transactions and parties to those 
transactions in order to account for mismatches that run afoul of new 
regulations.145 
3.  Issues With OECD Recommended Rules 
This Comment has previously discussed the OECD recommended rules.146  
These are rules the OECD expects countries to implement and abide by, but upon 
close analysis, the rules themselves have several problems.147 
In each set of recommended rules, the OECD proposes “linking rules,” and in 
a case where the main rule fails or is not used, the “defensive rule” will 
activate.148  The OECD, however, finds “linking” and “defensive” rules to be 
                                                            
 143. ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LTD.: BEPS ACTION POINT 2 ON HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 21, at 3.  Further proposals suggested amounts as high as twenty-five 
percent.  These related parties could be an investor in the company, a holder of company stock, or 
other securities holders.  For instance, under the OECD proposal, a stock holder in Ford who 
controls ten percent of their stock would be expected to know all of the companies’ tax transactions 
that could be affected by the proposal.  This puts a huge burden on the investor, while also 
diminishing the investor’s will to continue their investment strategies.  See generally Letter from 
Richard Middleton, Managing Director, Tax and Accounting Policy, AFME, & Sarah Wulff-
Cochrane, Director of Policy, BBA, to OECD (May 2, 2014) in OECD, COMMENTS RECEIVED ON 
PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFTS: BEPS ACTION 2: NEUTRALISE THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS 7 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/comments-action-2-hybrid-
mismatch-arrangements.pdf. 
 144. See id. (stating that at least a fifty percent interest in a transaction is appropriate to be 
subject to hybrid mismatch rules because at this level, one would have sufficient knowledge of the 
tax structure and lower the risk of catching non-tax related issues); Letter from WJ Dodwell, 
Deloitte LLP, to Dr. Achim Pross, Head, International Co-operation and Tax Administration 
Division, OECD/CTPA (May 2, 2014), in OECD, COMMENTS RECEIVED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION 
DRAFTS: BEPS ACTION 2: NEUTRALISE THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 
160 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/comments-action-2-hybrid-mismatch-arrange 
ments.pdf (concurring with a fifty percent ownership threshold); Letter from Paul Hale, Director, 
Head of Tax Affairs, Alternative Investment Management Association, to Achim Pross, Head, 
International Co-operation and Tax Administration Division, OECD (May 1, 2014) in OECD, 
COMMENTS RECEIVED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFTS: BEPS ACTION 2: NEUTRALISE THE 
EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 3-4 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/ 
aggressive/comments-action-2-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements.pdf. 
 145. ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LTD.: BEPS ACTION POINT 2 ON HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 21, at 3. 
 146. See supra Section III.C. 
 147. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 63–65. 
 148. Id. at 12. 
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nearly identical for each type of arrangement.149  For example, the rule for 
applying payment under a financial instrument that results in a hybrid mismatch 
is supposed to deny the deduction.  If this does not work, then the payer should 
include the instrument as regular income.  Similarly, the rule for payments that 
produce double deduction outcomes, would first deny the deduction in the parent 
jurisdiction and then, as a defensive rule, deny the deduction in the payer 
jurisdiction.150  The mismatch rules sound simple enough, but they are far from 
perfect. 
One serious problem related to mismatch arrangements is a lack of knowledge 
as to which nation is gaining and losing tax revenue.151  Undoubtedly, it is 
difficult to know when and where to apply the rule properly.152  A nation must 
first identify the mismatch arrangement, then ensure it is used for an aggressive 
tax planning purpose, and, finally, it must properly implement the rules set forth 
by the OECD.153  Even if this was all accomplished, the proposal would be 
difficult to coordinate and implement.  The OECD already acknowledged that it 
runs the risk of causing double taxation because jurisdictional authorities can 
easily become confused by the exact details of an arrangement. 154   If the 
implementation of a rule is not administered in a clear and efficient manner, the 
rule can potentially activate double taxation.155 
                                                            
 149. See generally id. at 33, 37, 51, 53, 59, 61 (subjecting different types of financial 
instruments to pairs of linking and defensive rules). 
 150. Id. at 37, 53. 
 151. See OECD, TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES, supra note 17, at 11 ( “[I]t is 
often difficult to determine which of the countries involved has lost tax revenue,” although 
“it is clear that collectively the countries concerned lose tax revenue.”). 
 152. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 63.  The OECD proposal states that “[j]urisdictions and taxpayers applying the rules 
will need to understand how a financial instrument or entity is treated in another jurisdiction . . . 
[and] whether or not hybrid rules are in operation in a counterparty jurisdiction.”  Id.  This will 
necessitate “work . . . to share information between jurisdictions and with taxpayers.”  Id. 
 153. See generally id. at 63–64 (discussing the complexities of identifying hybrid mismatch 
arrangements and their tax consequences, and the coordination between jurisdictions that will need 
to occur in order for the OECD proposal to work). 
 154. See id. at 12 (stating that the risk of double taxation is a main impetus of having both 
primary and defensive rules).  According to one report, “[t]ax practitioners have said they anticipate 
more aggressive audits around the world as countries implement the OECD’s recommendations—
and a huge increase in double tax disputes as a result”).  BLOOMBERG BNA, supra note 118. 
 155. See DELOITTE U.K., BEPS ACTION 2: HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS (2014), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-uk-beps-action-
2.pdf (expressing concern over “unilateral measures that may result in double taxation”); Letter 
from Catherine Schultz, Vice President for Tax Policy, Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, to Achim 
Pross, Head, International Co-operation and Tax Administration Division, OECD (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.nftc.org/default/tax/Comments%20on%20OECD%20Hybrid%20Mismatch%205-1-
14.pdf (stating that it will be “difficult for policymakers to determine the extent to which to adopt 
the rules, producing variations across jurisdictions and creating even more complexity” and that the 
rules leave open the possibility of double taxation).  See generally OECD, NEUTRALISING THE 
EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 60 (commenting on the need 
for further clarification of the proposed rules to avert double taxation). 
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Along the same lines, transactions could arise between countries that have 
implemented these rules and countries that have not.156  The OECD continuously 
states that the goal and best way for the rules to work is for all nations to 
implement all of its rules, which this Comment addresses as a near 
impossibility.157  Imagine a situation where there is a jurisdictional mismatch 
and one nation has the OECD rules in place, while the other nation has its own 
national legislation in place.158   It is unclear which rule to use, and which 
outcome makes the OECD rules useless or causes more problems.159 
It is important to note that not all of the rules the OECD wants to implement 
are problematic.  Some are beneficial and should be implemented regardless of 
the medium that they use to stop hybrid mismatch arrangements. 160   For 
instance, the OECD wants to limit the amount of useable credit from hybrid 
financial instruments and loans to decrease tax erosion.161  Additionally, the 
2014 proposal aims to implement rules from past proposals in order to ensure 
that existing tax regulations are in accordance with mismatch rules.162 
4.  Compliance Issues With Full Scale Implementation 
The largest analytical issue that has stemmed from the OECD proposal is the 
issue of compliance and expectation that countries will implement the proposal 
                                                            
 156. See generally OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 12, at 12 (discussing the need for defensive rules, which apply “ where 
there is no hybrid mismatch rule in the other jurisdiction”). 
 157. See id. at 60 (“The most reliable protection against imported mismatches will be for all 
jurisdictions to introduce rules . . . .”). 
 158. Id. at 63.  As one accounting firm warned, 
The high level of complexity creates a significant risk that the Action 2 recommendations 
will prove too difficult to administer in practice, for both tax authorities and taxpayers.  
This risk is likely to be exacerbated to the extent that jurisdictions fail to coordinate 
multilaterally as the OECD intends. Divergent and uncoordinated domestic rules enacted 
by various jurisdictions will create substantial compliance burdens for taxpayers and 
potential confusion among jurisdictions[.] 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, PWC’S COMMENTS ON ACTION 2, 10 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/ 
gx/en/tax/tax-policy-administration/beps/assets/hybrids-mismatches-may-2014.pdf. 
 159. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also MICHAEL CADESKY, THE U.S. VIEW 
ON BEPS 15 (2014), http://publications.ruchelaw.com/pdfs/2014-10/US_View_On_BEPS_ 
AOTCA.pdf (arguing, in a paper presented at the 2014 Asia-Oceanic Tax Association Conference, 
“[w]hile the goals [of a top-down approach] are specific, the remedy is vague and application of 
vague remedies in different countries can easily result in multiple adjustments that reach conflicting 
results—all countries involved in the cross border transaction assert primary jurisdiction to impose 
tax.”); BEPs Project Almost Completed: An Overview of the 2015 OECD Deliverables, BDO (Sept. 
25, 2015), http://www.bdo.be/en/news/professional-news/2015/beps-sept-2015/ (“[M]any 
interpretation issues remain and conflicting views between OECD Member States and developing 
countries are likely to result in tax controversy.”). 
 160. See OECD, NEUTRALIZING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, 
supra note 12, at 33–36. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. at 64–65. 
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in its entirety.163  Nations may try to comply, but the sheer complexities of the 
proposal and tax structures will make compliance difficult.164   Nations will 
inevitably interpret legislation differently, which may lead to unexpected 
compliance burdens.165 
A nation’s sovereignty and desire to compete on a world stage presents an 
additional issue.166  These arrangements stem in part from a need to compete in 
the global economy and countries are unlikely to implement legislation or 
treaties that make them less competitive.167  Currently, the strongest support for 
the OECD proposal comes from the European Commission, but if the EU 
attempts to adopt the proposal wholesale, it may face backlash from member 
states.168 
                                                            
 163. See Letter from Alex Postma to International Cooperation and Tax Administration 
Division, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD (May 2, 2014) (on file with 
LexisNexis). 
 164. See Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax 
Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REV 79, 161, 162 (2002) (explaining how coordination between countries 
when adopting rules to address hybrid arrangements could result in remaining unanswered 
questions); see also Letter from Krister Anderssen, Head, Tax Policy Department, Confederation 
of Swedish Enterprise, to OECD Centre on Tax Policy Administration (Apr. 29, 2014) (on file with 
LexisNexis) (illustrating that it is often very difficult for countries to determine who is losing out 
on a tax benefit and who is not in a hybrid arrangement — full implementation would still leave a 
mountain of issues regarding compliance logistics and identifying proper structures.); Arjo van 
Eijsden, The Relationship Between Corporate Responsibility and Tax: Unknown and Unloved, 22 
EC TAX REV. 60, 64 (2013) (stating that mismatch arrangements that fully comply with the law 
pose a major issue and achieve the undesireable double non-taxation in two jurisdictions).  
Implementing overly broad policies to stop a practice, when the regulations that are causing it are 
unknown, can create even more confusion in the long run.  Id. 
 165. See Letter from Ivo Tenten and Meera Patel, BASF SE, to Achim Pross, Head, 
International Co-Operation and Tax Administration Division, OECD/CTPA (May 2, 2014), in 
OECD, COMMENTS RECEIVED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFTS: BEPS ACTION 2: NEUTRALISE 
THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 60–63 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/ 
aggressive/comments-action-2-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements.pdf (suggesting that the only way 
the OECD proposal could prevail is for every nation to adopt exactly the same rules and regulations, 
and then have all of those jurisdictions interpret them exactly the same).  Not only is this unlikely 
to happen, some nations have no reason or intention to comply because they benefit from aggressive 
tax structuring.  See id. 
 166. See id. (stating that “it is not the role of the OECD to provide guidance to countries to 
change their domestic legislation,” the recommendations “conflict with the sovereignty of nations 
on national taxation,” and that countries are unlikely “to give up their sovereignty, especially not 
in cases where local incentives are intended”). 
 167. See id. (explaining that countries use different taxation policies and systems to achieve 
economic growth, resulting in tax competition). 
 168. See Peter Kavelaars, EU and OECD: Fighting against Tax Avoidance, 41 INTERTAX 507, 
510 (2013) (stating that the EU wants to implement its own legislation on “parent-subsidiary 
directives,” which is designed to target hybrid loans and other hybrid instruments to prevent non-
tax situations); see also EY EU Watch, 25 J. INT’L TAX’N 20, 20 (2014) (stating that the European 
Commission supports the OECD’s proposed rule that “the recipient country could refuse to grant 
an exemption if the payor is able to obtain a tax deduction”). 
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5.  Treaty Issues and Intra-Country Agreements 
The OECD proposal is overly ambitious and fails to account for many aspects 
of current tax laws and many commonly used financial instruments.169  Given 
the various treatments that mismatch arrangements face around the world,170 it 
is no wonder why corporations “treaty shop” for countries with the most 
favorable tax treatment, and why so many treaties have failed to effectively 
restrain hybrid mismatch arrangements.171 
Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, have made significant efforts 
to curtail hybrid mismatch arrangements, while others, such as Ireland, continue 
to permit aggressive tax structuring.172  Given this stark contrast in tax treatment, 
why would a company ever choose to go to a jurisdiction with more stringent 
tax rules?  Why not take advantage of every treaty possible when nations like 
the United States are implementing legislation that has exacerbated the use of 
hybrids and promoted more aggressive tax planning?173  Why would nations like 
Ireland ever choose to implement the OECD’s broad proposal when they know 
that they only stand to lose in the long-term and become less attractive to 
corporations?174 
                                                            
 169. See Michael L. Schler, BEPS Action 2: Ending Mismatches on Hybrid Instruments, Part 
2, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 19, 2014, 2014 TNT 160-6 (LexisNexis) (explaining that since the 
draft provides only an outline of the principles, countries will be more likely to adopt conflicting 
legislation rather than the uniform system that is sought by the OECD, and that the proposal fails 
to account for many common financial entities, such as regulated investment companies in the U.S. 
and controlled foreign corporations). 
 170. See supra Parts II–III. 
 171. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 4, 23–25 (discussing that the recommendations were generated as a result of concerns 
raised by countries experiencing mismatch arrangements and were designed to prevent treaty 
abuse); see also OECD, REVISED DISCUSSION DRAFT: FOLLOW UP WORK ON BEPS ACTION 6: 
PREVENTING TREATY ABUSE 6 (2014–2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/discussion-draft-
action-6-follow-up-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf [hereinafter OECD, FOLLOW UP WORK ON BEPS 
ACTION 6: PREVENTING TREATY ABUSE] (providing an example to demonstrate that the benefits 
conferred by different treaties produce treaty shopping because one country would confer more 
favorable tax treatment upon a pension fund than another). 
 172. OECD, TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES, supra note 17, at 15 nn. 6–7, 17 n.14, 18 
nn.16–17; Darby & Lemaster, supra note 56, at 2, 12, 14; Kleinbard, supra note 59, at 733; Stephen 
C. Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 825, 
836–39 (2014). 
 173. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 894(c)(1) (2012) (prohibiting reduced rates for withholding taxes in 
cases where there is an income tax treaty with a foreign country). 
 174. See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text (discussing national sovereignty and the 
desire to maintain a competitive corporate tax regime); see also Robert A. Green, The Future of 
Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 21 
(1993) (“As long as multinationals have the ability to shift the reported source of their income, 
governments imposing source-based corporate income taxes will have an incentive to compete for 
this shiftable income.”).  In a similar fashion, “[t]he current U.S. corporate income tax rate of 35% 
is the highest in the OECD, and that does not serve the country well—the greater the difference 
between the U.S. and foreign corporate tax rates, the greater the incentives for shifting income 
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The OECD has attempted to address such issues with further legislation and 
a change to its model tax convention, but this approach is equally unlikely to 
succeed because it has already been shown that deviations from the OECD 
convention can lead to problems with definitions and implementation.175 
V. CHANGING THE FOCUS: A BI-LATERAL TREATY APPROACH 
Apple’s tax structure illustrates the current flaws with the world’s approach 
to hybrid mismatch arrangements.176  Year after year, Apple generates some of 
the highest revenue of any corporation in the world while paying some of the 
lowest taxes.177   Using reverse hybrids, hybrid financial instruments in the 
United States, hybrid entity payments in the United Kingdom, and importing 
mismatches from several other nations, Apple legally reduced its tax burden all 
over the world.178  Why then should the answer to mismatch arrangements be 
further domestic legislation, which countries will not uniformally agree on and 
multinational corporations will circumvent? 
This approach from the OECD will likely fail given that similar approaches 
have also failed in other aspects of international taxation.179  The OECD must 
realize that nations are unlikely to implement sweeping tax legislation proposals 
on a domestic level.180  Variables such as sovereignty, international competition, 
and differing opinion will likely stymie implementation, which, in turn, will lead 
                                                            
abroad.”  Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International Competition, 
and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 428 (2013). 
 175. See OECD Action 2, supra note 8, at 13 (stating that “[t]he rules must be the same in each 
jurisdiction” with “jurisdiction neutral definitions”); see also OECD, FOLLOW UP WORK ON BEPS 
ACTION 6: PREVENTING TREATY ABUSE, supra note 168, at 9–13 (discussing all the changes that 
should be made to the OECD model tax treaty, including definitional issues). 
 176. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 103–07, 112-14. 
 179. For example, with regard to transfer pricing, much like with hybrid mismatch 
arrangements, the OECD proposed “ideal” transfer pricing guidelines that it wanted every nation 
to implement.  Compare OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 59–60 (2010),  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/tpg-2010-en 
(explaining situations where transaction profit methods and traditional transaction methods would 
be more suitable for one country than another country), with Australia Introduces Multinational 
Anti-Avoidance Legislation, 26 J. INT’L TAX’N 17, 21 (2015) (noting that the Netherlands conforms 
to the OECD guidelines); OECD, TRANSFER PRICING COUNTRY PROFILES: UNITED KINGDOM 
(2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/transferpricingcountryprofiles.htm (showing that 
as of September 2012, the United Kingdom had made reference to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and included a definition in their tax code, but it had not instituted transfer pricing 
methods or set specific penalties for transfer pricing).  See generally OECD, TRANSFER PRICING 
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm (outlining transfer 
pricing guidelines). While some nations implemented the guidelines, others did not adopt them as 
laid out, if at all. 
 180. See supra Section IV.C. 
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to treaty shopping.181  The OECD must focus its approach on proposed changes 
to bilateral treaties instead of significant changes to domestic laws, which would 
allow nations to bargain for some leeway while creating the desired regulatory 
effect. 
In its current report, the OECD discusses treaties and proposes that nations 
implement the entire OECD model tax convention in addition to the other rules 
they are encouraging.182  If such a proposal took effect, it would represent a 
major overhaul of the international tax scheme.183  Every nation would be on the 
same footing, using the same documents, and realizing the tax structure of each 
individual nation.  While implementing this approach would be much easier, the 
reality of each nation actually doing this is highly unlikely.184 
This Comment suggests that a proposal focused on promoting and changing 
bilateral treaties between nations instead of suggesting sweeping international 
tax law conversion will be more likely to yield better results for several reasons.  
First, the proposal would only position the OECD in an intermediary role. 
Instead of appearing to force sweeping changes upon countries, the organization 
will have greater international appeal, which will improve the likelihood of the 
proposal’s implementation.  Next, bilaterial treaties give sovereign nations the 
ability to implement tax rules that commensurate with their unique 
circumstances and characteristics, allowing them to more easily address the 
issue of double taxaton.  Finally, bilateral treaties will make complicated 
mismatch arrangement transactions easier to track, and will allow countries to 
come to a solution instead of forcing independent legislative change. 
Some treaties have already successfully targeted these arrangements, but 
corporations continue to treaty-shop185 around this approach because it is often 
not specific enough to preexisting arrangements. 186   Efforts to combat this 
problem can be seen to some extent in existing tax legislation.  Denmark, for 
                                                            
 181. See supra Section IV.C.5. 
 182. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 11, 18–19. 
 183. See generally id. (alluding to the extensive changes that would need to be made in order 
for the proposal to be effectuated as the OECD envisions it). 
 184. See Sections IV.C.4–5. 
 185. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 15, 40–41.  Companies can currently use the nations where treaties are most beneficial 
to them, and because most treaties do not discuss payments made under mismatch arrangements, it 
is easy for companies to find a beneficial treaty.  Under this approach, however, it is easier to 
implement rules that will cut down on treaty hunting by simplifying the treaty process to only two 
nations at a time. See id. 
 186. See, e.g., Income Tax Convention art. XIV, U.S. – Can., Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 
11,087.  The treaty states: 
Income derived by an individual who is a resident of a Contracting State in respect of 
independent personal services may be taxed in that State.  Such income may also be taxed in the 
other Contracting State if the individual has or had a fixed base regularly available to him in that other 
State but only to the extent that the income is attributable to the fixed base. 
Id. 
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example, places contingencies on certain provisions that apply to nations with 
which they have a treaty.187  Such provisions would need to be expanded and 
placed within these hybrid-specific treaties, so that specific instruments are 
covered by the different nations.188 
Drawing inspiration from the OECD report, the nations would need an 
inclusion rate for related parties, which would provide guidance on how much 
of a stake a given party needs in a transaction to be subject to the treaty.189  Such 
an agreement must be reached to prevent the overinclusion of instruments, which 
is a major problem with the current proposal.190 
The OECD report also proposes some rules that will be useful for 
implementation into these bilateral treaties. 191   For instance, the OECD 
recommends limiting the amount of credit that can be used in connection with 
hybrid financial instruments, such as collateralized “repo” loans.192  The United 
States has already implemented similar legislation domestically and has entered 
into bilateral treaties to limit the use of foreign tax credits. 193   Because 
jurisdictions view current tax rules in different ways, limiting such instruments 
is of the utmost importance to limit tax erosion.194  It would be far more feasible 
for countries to implement these rules through treaties, rather than for each 
country to change its domestic law, in concert.195 
                                                            
 187. See OECD, TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES, supra note 17, at 17. 
 188. See, e.g., id.  The report discusses Section 2A of the Danish Corporate Tax Act and how 
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 191. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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 194. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 40–41. 
 195. To analogize from the example of double-taxation treaties, one commentator, while 
criticizing such treaties, notes benefits of “reciprocity,” as well as “more compatible tax laws, 
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information, reduced bureaucratic burden for taxpayers, increased investor certainty, and improved 
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POL. 939, 987–88 (2000) (discussing the benefits of double taxation treaties).  And, “[b]ecause the 
costs of not having access to treaty benefits can be significant, treaties provide an incentive for 
nations to standardize their tax systems.”  Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: 
Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 145 
(2009). 
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Finally, countries that are parties to a treaty could devise precise provisions 
that narrowly target hybrid mismatch arrangements.196  The resulting instrument 
will be a document that presents a tailored approach to hybrids, neutralizing 
mismatches between two nations without the collateral dangers of overinclusion 
that are present in the OECD proposal.197  The OECD hints at such an approach 
at the end of its proposal, but only with regard to the model tax convention.198  
If the OECD and each constituent jurisdiction can focus on these pointed treaties 
instead of a broad convention, the international community will come closer to 
neutralizing the ill effects of  mismatches. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment seeks to provide meaningful insight into the history and use of 
hybrid mismatch arrangements and critique the new OECD proposal to stem 
their adverse effects for revenue collection.  The proposal is far from perfect and 
there is much work to be done to accomplish the goal of neutralizing these 
arrangements.  A directive that countries enact sweeping changes in their 
domestic laws will not effectuate this goal.  As stated above, not only is it 
extremely ambitious to believe that all countries will suddenly change their 
domestic laws to match the new proposal, it is strange to think each country 
would interpret the proposal and the issues it raises in exactly the same way.199  
                                                            
 196. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGMENTS, supra 
note 12, at 23–25. 
  The OECD’s 1999 report, titled “The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to 
Partnerships”, and their 2010 report, titled “The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the 
Income of Collective Investment Vehicles”, each conclude that countries should “seek to ensure that 
the provisions of tax treaties produce appropriate results when applied to partnerships and 
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 197. See supra note 195. 
 198. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra 
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 199. See Letter from Alex Postma to International Cooperation and Tax Administration 
Division, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD (May 2, 2014) (on file with 
LexisNexis). 
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In practice, a complete overhaul in domestic law is unlikely to happen and will 
not solve the problems that mismatch arrangements present. 
Truly tackling these arrangements will require changes to bilateral treaties.  
Such an approach will require more groundwork on the part of each individual 
nation but will prove more beneficial in the long run.  The OECD approach has 
underestimated the complexities of its proposal and the vast scale on which it 
seeks to effectuate change.200  Its directives must be changed and a new approach 
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